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THE CHARITABLE CHOICE PROGRAM AND THE
LOWN CASE: A REASONABLE SOLUTION
MATTHEW STRABONE*
I.

Introduction

This paper investigates one aspect of the debate concerning Charitable Choice legislation, specifically, staffing discrimination by faith-based organizations [hereinafter "FBOs"] on
the basis of religion when executing government contracts to
perform welfare services paid for with federal and state government funds. Up to now, any proposed solutions to this debate
have hardly been solutions at all: they advocate a complete
victory for one side or the other. This paper hopes to reach common ground that each side can find acceptable. Part I discusses
the legislative background of the issue and broadly outlines the
arguments in support of each side of the debate. Part II discusses
the recent federal district court ruling in Lown v. Salvation
Army /-the only case law on point thus far-with some critique
and a prediction as to how that court will rule later in the trial.
Part III argues that the matter should be taken out of the hands
of the judiciary and suggests a political solution that can
potentially appease both sides.
A. Legislative and Regulatory Background
Under Section 702 of the Federal Civil Rights Act of
1964, religious organizations are permitted to hire only employees who share their religious beliefs.2 There was some question
as to whether this only applied to sectarian work, but this issue
was addressed by the passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which broadened Section 702 to exempt
*J.D. 2007, University of Southern California.
Lown v. Salvation Army, 393 F.Supp.2d 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2006).
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religious organizations from charges of religious emplo yment
discrimination regardless of the nature of employment. This
Act was upheld by the Supreme Court in Corp. of the Presiding
Bishop
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
4
Amos.
The plaintiff was a building engineer employed at a
nonprofit gymnasium that was operated by the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints and open to the public. 5 He was
"discharged because he failed to qualify for a 'temple recommend' certifying that he was a member of the church and eligible to attend its temples," and subsequently brought an action
against the Church in federal district court alleging that the
religious employment discrimination violated Section 703 of the
Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964.6 The District Court held that
the plaintiffs employment involved strictly nonreligious activity and that applying Section 702 to nonreligious activities
"has the primary effect of advancing religion," thus violating the
Establishment Clause and making Section 702 unconstitutional. 7
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Section 702
does not violate the Establishment Clause. Applying the rational
basis review standard, the Court gave two chief reasons for
upholding Section 702. First, Section 702 "is rationally related
to the legitimate purpose of alleviating significant governmental
interference with the ability of religious organizations to define
and carry out their religious missions" and thus does not impermissibly entangle church and state, but, rather, "effectuates a
more complete separation of the two." 8 Second, a law is not
invalid simply because it allows churches to advance religion
where the government itself is not advancing religion "through
3

id.

4 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day

Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).

SId. at 330.
1d. at 330-31.

6

7Id. at 331-33.
8 Id. at 339.
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its own activities and influence," and any advancement of religion achieved by the gymnasium9 in this case cannot reasonably
be attributed to the government.
Amos is of limited use to the issue at hand, however,
because the opinion only deals with the private activities of
FBOs and does not discuss religious employment discrimination
in the fulfillment of a government contract.
Congress had adopted a variety of often conflicting
approaches to deal with this issue, such as including additional
statutory civil rights language without mentioning employment,
including "additional statutory civil rights language that specifically mentions employment," including additional statutory civil
rights language that specifically mentions employment and
specifically eliminates the Section 702 religious hiring exemption, and remaining entirely silent on the issue, in federallysuch as Head Start and the Workforce Investfunded programs
0
ment Act.'
These various rules had the effect of keeping FBOs out
of many government-funded welfare services because of the
particular difficulty FBOs had with compliance with all the different regulations, particularly if an FBO wanted to administer
multiple programs with conflicting hiring rules in the same
place (such as drug treatment and job placement in the same
homeless shelter)." I One of2 the first acts of the Bush Administration was to change this.'
Through a series of statutory provisions and executive
orders, the President has seemingly removed any doubt as to
whether FBOs may discriminate against potential employees on
a religious basis when performing government-funded welfare
9 Id.at 337.
'0 White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, Executive
Office of the President, Protecting the Civil Rights and Religious Liberty of
Faith-Based Organizations:Why Religious Hiring Must Be Preserved (June 23,
2003), availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/fbcilbooklet.pdf.
11Id
12id
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services.13 The President moved to establish the White House
Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives' 4 and was able
to get a series of statutory provisions and regulations for various
federally-funded welfare services, known as the Charitable
Choice legislation, passed by a friendly Congress.' 5 The language of the legislation states: "A religious organization's exemption provided under section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
regarding employment practices shall not be affected by its
participation in, or receipt of funds from," federally-funded
welfare programs.16 The legislation further provides that no state
may discriminate against FBOs for any reason when
awarding
7
government contracts to provide welfare services.'
Following the passage of the Charitable Choice legislation, the President issued an executive order reaffirming the
above-mentioned tenets of Charitable Choice in order "to ensure
equal protection of the laws for faith-based and community
organizations."' 18 With two branches of government in agreement on this policy of permissible religious employment discrimination, proponents and critics alike waited with bated breath
for the courts to weigh in. The judiciary's first foray into the
debate was Lown v. Salvation Army, discussed infra.

13 See,

e.g., Charitable Choice Provisions Applicable to the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program, 45 C.F.R. § 260 (2003).
14Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499 (January 29, 2001).
1"42 U.S.C. § 604a (2006); 45 C.F.R. § 260 (2003); 42 U.S.C. § 9920 (2006);
45 C.F.R. § 1050 (2003); 42 U.S.C. § 300x-65 (2006); 42 C.F.R. §§ 54-54a

(2003).
16 42 U.S.C. § 604a(f) (2006).
1742 U.S.C. § 604a(g) (2006).
18Exec.

Order No. 13,279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,141 (Dec 12, 2002).
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B. The Policy Debate
The pro-religious staffing side [hereinafter "the religious
side"] employs a number of policy arguments in support of their
position. They view the contracted FBOs in question as privatesector organizations that "collaborate" with the government
rather than as agents of the government, and point out that such
private groups (such as Planned Parenthood) have always been
permitted to staff on ideological bases. 19 To deny this freedom
to FBOs, they say, would be the true discrimination. Any concerted efforts to that end expose "religious tolerance" as a form
of bigotry: such thinking denigrates religion as unimportant and
not to be taken seriously. 20 Marginalizing religion in this
manner flies in the face of the true religious pluralism contemplated by the First Amendment: religious freedom can only be
realized if every FBO can exist within its own
fundamental
21
value system without government interference.
This side further argues that religious staffing is vital for
FBOs to retain their identities.22 They believe that the ability to
hire those of like-minded faith helps foster the kind of environment of compassion for the needy that is essential to providing the best service. 23 Moreover, they warn that if FBOs are
forced to incorporate religious diversity, the religious diversity
of society itself would suffer, just as if political diversity would
suffer if the Democratic or Republican
Party were forced to staff
24
without regard to political belief.

19 Carl H. Esbeck, Stanley W. Carlson-Thies & Ronald J. Sider, The Freedom of
Faith-Based Organizations to Staff on a Religious Basis 88 (2004).
20 Id. at 88-89.
21 Id.

at 89.

2 Id. at
23
2

90.
Id. at 16-17.

4 Id. at 92.
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The anti-religious staffing side [hereinafter "the secular
side"] concedes that a FBO retains the right to staff according to
faith when strictly acting within its capacity as a religious
organization. When the staff's salary is subsidized by public tax
dollars to perform government-contracted functions, however,
this side believes that the staff becomes employed by the federal
government, and as such, the FBO's right to discriminate is forfeited. 25 Furthermore, this side views FBOs as a fount of intolerance towards women and homosexuals, 26 and sees such hiring
discrimination as a rollback of civil rights protections
that will
27
open the door to discrimination on other grounds.
On a different level, this side fears that allowing FBOs to
hire welfare service staff on the basis of religion further jeopardizes the religious freedom of service recipients by increasing
the likelihood of religious coercion. 28 Moreover, that these
discriminatory hiring practices occur despite federal subsidization (meaning religious organizations are treated like private
organizations) makes the secular side suspicious that giving
FBOs an opportunity to provide welfare services
is a step
29
towards complete privatization of such services.

25

The Rev. Dr. C. Welton Gaddy, Interfaith Leader Commends Rep. Bobby

Scott for Introducing Legislation Blocking White House "Side-Step" to Enact
Government-Funded Religion (press release) (2003), available at http://www.
religionandsocialpolicy.org/news/article.cfin?id=707.
26 David Cole, Faith and Funding: Toward an Expressivist Model of the Establishment Clause, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 559, 563 (2002).
27 Gaddy, supra note 25.
28 Paul W. Ambrosius, The End of Welfare as We Know It and the Establishment
Clause: Government Grants to Religious Organizations under the Personal
Responsibility Act of 1996,28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 135, 157 (1996).
29 Cole, supra note 26, at 562.
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The Legal Disputes

That the government itself may not discriminate on religious grounds is not in dispute. 30 However, whether the Constitution must be construed to prohibit the government from providing public funds to FBOs providing welfare services that discriminate in their hiring practices on the basis of religion, or if it
must be construed to allow such FBOs to continue their hiring
practices, is a point of disagreement. 3' The secular side believes
that government funding of such organizations offends the
Establishment Clause by advancing religion, offends the Free
Exercise Clause by supporting employment conditioned on
religion, and offends the Equal Protection Clause by supporting
discrimination.3 2
The religious side counters that mere government
funding "does not render the faith-based organizations 'state
actors,"' and that the Constitution does not regulate the conduct
of private citizens. 33 The Establishment Clause is not offended,
they contend, for two reasons: providing welfare services is a
secular endeavor, and employment decisions made by such
FBOs could not be reasonably attributed to the government.
Thus, the government does no advancing or endorsing of religion. 34 They further claim that "under the Free Speech Clause,"
FBOs "must be free to choose their membership" according to
their tenets, particularly if the government allows secular
welfare service providers to staff according to their own secular
tenets (pro-choice staff at Planned Parenthood, etc). 35
30

Working Group on Human Needs and Faith-Based and Community

Initiatives, Agreed Statement of Current Law on Employment Practices, FaithBased Organizations, and Government Funding, 3 (2003), available at
http://www.working-group.org/Documents/StatementOnCurrentLaw.pdf.
3 Id. at 4.

32 Id.
3 3 id.
34 id.

35id.
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A third view is that the Constitution requires neither that
the practice must be prohibited nor that FBOs must be permitted
to continue their hiring practices; it is the place of the legislative
and executive organs of government to determine policy on the
issue. 36 After extensive analysis of the recent Lown case, this
paper will ultimately adopt the third view, with important
caveats.
II.

Lown v. Salvation Army

Lown is the first (and remains the only) case to tackle the
issue of employment discrimination on the basis of religion in
the execution of a government contract to provide welfare services to the public. The case itself has not yet been completed,
but the inevitable outcome can be gleaned from the latest ruling
in the case. The ruling, filed on September 30, 2005 in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, was a ruling 37
on a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint.
A. Background
Lown saw "eighteen present and former employees of the
Salvation Army" bring an action for relief against the Salvation
Army, the City of New York, and the commissioners of several
state and local government entities that contract
with the
38
services.
social
of
provision
the
for
Salvation Army
The arm of the Salvation Army in question in this case,
the SSC, runs various social service programs in and around
New York City, a number of which involve "governmentmandated custodial care," including "foster care and adoption
services, group homes, boarding homes, a non-secure detention
facility for juvenile delinquents, services for children with
36

37
38

Id. at 5.
Lown, 393 F.Supp.2d at 223.
id.
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39
developmental disabilities, HIV services, and group day care."
Roughly 90% of the SSC's clientele is assigned to SSC involuntarily by government agencies. 40 SSC is subject to significant
regulatory oversight in the provision of these services, and
receives more than 95% of its yearly budget "from its contracts
with government entities." 4' The salaries of SSC's employees
are "paid virtually in full" from the government contracts; the
"contracts prohibit SSC from engaging in unlawful employment
discrimination. 42 The plaintiffs alleged that the SSC gives
"10% of the revenue from its government contracts to the Salvawhich uses these funds "to advance its relition Army Church,"
' 43

gious mission."

In the months leading up to the plaintiffs' suit, the Salvation Army began to "infuse religion into SSC's workplace,"
despite the Salvation Army's history of religious tolerance for
the employees at SSC; SSC even had its own secular mission
statement. 44 The Salvation Army implemented a "Reorganization Plan" meant to promote the "Salvationist spirit" among the
Salvation Army's social service programs, taking the view that
the Salvation Army "is not a Social Service Agency [but] a
Christian Movement with a Social Service program." 45 The
Reorganization Plan outlined new responsibilities for Salvation
Army leaders, such as requiring the Secretary for Social Services of the Greater New York Division to "conduct all
activities of his office with a view to accomplishing the Army's
fundamental purpose of proclaiming Jesus Christ as Savior and
Lord, which purpose must find expression in both4 6the message
proclaimed and the ministry of service performed.
39 id.
40 Id.
41

Id.at 228.

42

Id. at 228.
Lown, 393 F.Supp.2d at 229.

43

"Id.
45 id.
46

Id. at 230.
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The plaintiffs alleged that expressions of Christian faith
have appeared in the workplace since the Reorganization Plan
began, such as recitation of prayers at staff meetings and functions, frequent depositing of religious publications in employee
mailboxes, conspicuous display of religious publications, and
regular public postings for prayer meetings and other religious
events. 47 The plaintiffs claimed that these circumstances and the
Salvation Army's intrusive inquiries into the nature of their
beliefs had created a hostile work environment that led to their
constructive termination.48 The plaintiffs alleged violations of
the Equal Protection Clause, the Establishment Clause, and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, as well as parallel provisions of
state and local law. 49 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss
all claims. 50 The claims against the Salvation Army were dismissed entirely, and all but one of the claims against the
government defendants was dismissed.5 ' Only the Establishment
Clause claim based on taxpayer standing against the government
defendants survived.52
B. Equal Protection Clause Claim against the
Government
The Lown decision was not a particularly friendly one for
the secular side, and the ruling in Lown indicates that Equal Protection Clause claims in these circumstances will not be recognized. One might claim that the court may have left a sliver of
hope for recognizing future claims of this sort, but the court
slams this door shut by applying the rational basis test to the

47 id..

48 Id.
49

Lown, 393 F.Supp.2d at 223 (Please note: this paper only examines the federal

claims).
50 id.

51 id
52 id.
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government contracts even after stating that the claim itself
would be denied, in what could be termed judicial overkill.
To- support their Equal Protection claim against the
government, the plaintiffs relied on Norwood v. Harrison,53 a
case that prohibited the government from providing textbooks to
private schools that engaged in racial discrimination.54 The
plaintiffs made the argument that Norwood forbids the government from providing material support to discriminatory organizations. 55 The court refused to accept this argument, noting that
Norwood has never been applied to religious discrimination, and
the
that "discrimination on the basis of religion may stem from
56
right to free exercise, which is constitutionally protected.,
The court's primary rationale for dismissing the Equal
Protection claim against the government on the grounds that the
plaintiffs failed to state a claim was that the plaintiffs never
alleged (nor, we can assume, could it be proven) that the government itself "expressly classified on the basis of religion,
intended to discriminate, nor possessed animus in the execution
of the contracts at issue." 57 The court pointed out that the
contracts existed before the Salvation Army began its allegedly
discriminatory practices. Thus, with no allegations of "intent or
purpose" against the government, and the indication in the
plaintiffs' other claims that the government' had intended the
Salvation Army not discriminate, the Equal Protection claim
against the government was barred.58
This may provide an opening for future claims to be
made against the government for funding charities that discriminate on religious base. The court clearly states that the awarding
of the government contracts prior to the discriminatory practices
points toward a lack of intention to discriminate on the part of
" 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
54 Lown, 393 F.Supp.2d at 226.
55 id.
56

Id.

57

id.

58 Id.
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the government. If such contracts are awarded after a charity has
been plainly discriminating on religious grounds, it stands to
reason that this would prove sufficient for an Equal Protection
claim to at least be analyzed by the court. This is of little
comfort, however, as indicated next.
The court goes on to rebut the plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim in detail despite a clear intent to dismiss it anyway.
Relying on Amos, the court asserts that the Equal Protection
Clause requires only a rational basis review of the government
contracts, noting that "[t]he contracts are religion-neutral, and
they were executed for the permissible purpose of providing
social services. 59 Without any analysis under this review, the
court concludes that the contracts "plainly survive" rational
60
basis scrutiny, and leaves it at that.
C. Establishment Clause Claim against the
Government
The Lown court threw the plaintiffs a small bone by ruling
that the plaintiffs had stated an Establishment Clause "claim
upon which relief can be granted.",6 1 The court indicated that
"[i]f individuals who were involuntarily referred to SSC's programs were subjected to religious instruction, indoctrination, or
practice, government support for those programs would raise a
substantial Establishment Clause issue," and that this would be
revealed in discovery prior to trial.62 This is far from a victory
for the plaintiffs, however. Note that the court only states that
conduct affecting the recipients of the social services, rather
than conduct affecting employees of the social services agency,
63
will
raise for
an Establishment
Certainly offends
government
support
a FBO that Clause
overtlyissue.
proselytizes
the
59

Id at 237.

60

Lown, 393 F.Supp.2d at 237.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 240.
Id.

61
62
63
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Establishment Clause, so the Lown court is hardly breaking new
ground here. What is troubling for the plaintiffs is that the court
shows no willingness to accept the argument that government
support for discriminating-in-employment FBOs raises an
Establishment Clause issue; since this is almost certainly the
case the plaintiffs will attempt to make, it is inevitable that the
plaintiffs will fail on this claim as well.
D. Constitutional Claims against the Salvation Army
Against the Salvation Army, the plaintiffs raised Free
Exercise Clause and Equal Protection Clause claims. The Lown
court dismissed the claims for lack of a showing of state action,
refusing to accept the plaintiffs' premise that the Salvation
Army's provision of social services is so interconnected with the
government that its actions can be attributed to the government. 64 To the court, "[i]n setting and implementing internal
employment policies, the Salvation Army does not perform a
government
function that warrants an inference of state
65
,
action.
The court employed the test set forth in Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 66 wherein the court considers "'whether the function
performed has been traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the
State.', 67 The court concluded that, regardless of whether the
employees in question were hired to perform services that were
traditionally provided by the state, internal personnel management of a contracted private entity is not a traditional function
of the government. 68 The court also held that the "plaintiffs
failed to allege facts showing that the personnel decisions"
could be "reasonably attributed to the government," stating that

64Id. at 241.
65 id.
66
67
68

Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
Lown, 393 F.Supp.2d at 241.
Id. at 242.
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"'[m]ere approval or acquiescence' on the part of
the govern69
ment defendants does not amount to state action."

The court went on to state that the Salvation Army was
not so intertwined with government that its conduct could be
considered state action. 70 Among its reasons, the court mentioned that the plaintiffs had made no allegations indicating that
the government had any role in creating or enforcing the allegedly discriminatory policies, that any government agents held
positions of authority within the Salvation Army, or that public
employee benefits were available to Salvation Army
employees .71

E. Employment Discrimination Claim
In addition to their constitutional claims against the
Salvation Army, the plaintiffs brought "statutory discrimination
claims against the Salvation Army pursuant to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. "72 Ruling that Section 702 of Title
VII, which grants religious organizations an exception to Title
VII and permits them to discriminate in hiring on religious
grounds, applies to the claim, and unwilling to hold Section 702
unconstitutional for violating the Establishment Clause, the
court stated that Section 702 was a bar to the plaintiffs' discrimination claims and dismissed them. 73 Given the long history of
Section 702 (and the holding supporting its constitutionality in
Amos), it is no surprise that the court, a mere district court after
all, declined to declare it unconstitutional for violating the
Establishment Clause. Furthermore, given the language of 702,
coupled with President Bush's Executive Order prohibiting state
and local governments from discriminating against FBOs when

69

70

Id. at 243.
Id. at 244.

71 Id.

72

Id. at 245.

73

Lown, 393 F.Supp.2d at 246.
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award social service contracts, 74 the court had no choice but the
preclude the plaintiffs' claims. This situation illuminates the
need for a statutory solution rather than a judicial one, as will be
argued infra.
F. Establishment Clause Prognostication
The plaintiffs will clearly claim that the government violates the Establishment Clause by funding FBOs with hiring
procedures that discriminate on religious grounds, asserting that
the government must bear responsibility for religious indoctri75
nation of employees that is directly supported by public funds.
The argument to be made is that the Salvation Army could not
have hired the employees if not for the funding, and the
employees would not have been exposed to the indoctrination if
not for the hiring. 76 It is an argument that will carry more weight
in Lown than in future cases, since the employees in Lown were
hired prior to the allegedly coercive and discriminatory practices
at SSC, whereas plaintiffs hired by a FBO that has always
discriminated would probably be expected to know what they
were getting into.
This argument will ultimately fail because "the government has a different relationship" with "service program" recipients than with a FBO's employees. 77 The Lown court has heretofore been unwilling to stretch its interpretation of constitutional
clauses or federal statutes very far at all, and it would probably
only accept this argument if providing the plaintiffs' jobs was an
essential part of the service program's benefits. 78 Further, if the
courts recognized such claims, the government would be
responsible for religious discrimination by FBOs that required
Exec. Order No. 13,279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,141 (Dec 12, 2002).
75 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-BasedInitiative and the Constitution, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. I, 103 (2005).
76 Id. at 104.
74

77 Id.
78

id.
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even greater inferential leaps.79 For instance, if a FBO had previously been using its own private funds to support social service programs and then receives government funding for those
same programs, the FBO could theoretically use the money it
has saved to hire a new employee according to strict religious
regulations for unrelated sectarian work; the restriction on
religious-based hiring
the plaintiffs seek could be applied to this
80
new position also.
This paper makes no claims as to the merits of such a
line of reasoning. It is more important to instead note that such
reasoning would inevitably bring down the entire Charitable
Choice regime, a program for which both the President and
Congress have solid support. This would be a complete defeat
for the religious side; just the sort of outcome this paper hopes
to avoid. However, when the Lown court ignores this argument
(as appears inevitable) a complete defeat for the secular side
will result, and this outcome is equally undesirable. The fact that
there is simply no legal middle ground for the Lown court, or
indeed any court, to take on this issue is perhaps the clearest
endorsement of a political and legislative solution of this
problem.
III.

A Possible Compromise

If Lown is any indication, future courts will be unwilling
to interpret the Constitution as mandating or forbidding religious staffing discrimination in the execution of government contracts to provide welfare services. Since this places the legality
of Charitable Choice in the hands of the other two branches of
government, the secular side is left with no option but powerless
dissent until there is a change in Washington. This result itself is
something of a compromise because neither side is permanently
shut out. However, under this system, the concerns of one side
will always be ignored while the other side is in power, and this
79

Id. at 105.

80 id.
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is not an ideal outcome. Some kind of balance should be struck
to address the concerns of both sides at once: in today's acrimonious and polarized political climate, any chance to bring
two opposing sides together in a compromise should be taken.
A possible three-step compromise begins with allowing
FBOs to maintain their ability to discriminate in their hiring
practices, provided such discrimination does not carry into the
provision of the social services. If a FBO believes that a
religiously homogeneous environment best fosters a spirit of
service and, more importantly, is most effective in providing
social services, the benefit to society may outweigh the relatively small burden imposed on those of incompatible religions
wishing to work for unaccommodating FBOs, though this would
be up to each municipality to decide, discussed in more detail
infra.
The second step changes the language of the Charitable
Choice legislation and executive orders that prohibits state and
local governments from withholding government welfare service contracts from high-bidder FBOs that practice religious
staffing discrimination. Municipal governments would have the
ability to deny contracts to high-bidder FBOs, but FBOs would
retain the right to bid for all such government contracts in all
jurisdictions. Prior to the Charitable Choice initiative, local
governments had been able to shut FBOs out of the bidding
process entirely; after Charitable Choice, state and local government had no choice but to award welfare service contracts to
FBOs if they were the highest bidder.
The third step mandates a hearing for high-bidder FBOs
with the decision-making government body after being denied a
welfare service contract by a state or local government, in
essence giving high-bidder FBOs an appeals process. This
would add an element of transparency to the bidding process
and give FBOs an opportunity to make a compelling argument
for their participation in the provision of welfare services,
something previous approaches have lacked.
The end result of this compromise puts the final say in
the hands of local communities-the most accountable govern-
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ment entities-rather than in the hands of the federal government. FBOs retain the freedom to staff on a religious basis if
they wish, retain the ability to bid for government contracts, and
are given the opportunity to present their case to a skeptical
state or local government if they are the highest bidder. Individual communities can then weigh the necessary factors and
make a final, informed decision when awarding welfare service
contracts. This gives municipalities more freedom to contract
with whomever they wish rather than have a contractor forced
upon them by the federal government. Further, voters for whom
this issue is important may now elect community council members who share their views, giving the local electorate a similar
say in this process as it has in choosing the curriculum of public
community schools.
One may be reasonably concerned that this compromise
would create a confusing patchwork quilt situation: similarly
situated high bidder FBOs in two separate communities may not
receive the same result. This would particularly be a problem for
nationwide FBOs such as the Salvation Army who could theoretically make identical winning bids to provide identical services
in two nearly identical communities and win one community's
contract but not the other's because of the differing prevailing
political opinions on the two communities' city councils. These
concerns, however, are overstated-a FBO that bids for a
government contract and does not win the contract is no differently situated than any other private contractor unsuccessfully bidding for the same contract. All the FBO has lost is the
time spent putting the bid together, and this is an inherent risk
when bidding for a contract.
Government welfare service contracts are awarded to fill
a need in a given community. This need will be filled by the
contractor of the community's choice according to the standards
that community has set. This maximizes a community's freedom
to do business in the manner it wishes. Similarly, FBOs keep the
right to staff on a religious basis and bid for all government
welfare service contracts, and this maximizes the freedom of
FBOs to conduct their own business as they see fit. Because this
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41

compromise maintains or extends the freedoms of the interested
parties, avoids any forced partnerships, and addresses political
concerns at the most accountable level, it is a reasonable
solution to a polarizing issue.

